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Observing and Funding African Research  
Rigas Arvanitisa & Johann Moutonb 
Abstract 
This document presents an overview of (recent) historical as well as current trends in scientific production in Africa. This 
review clearly shows that there has been a reversal of trends in scientific production that started around the turn of the 
millennium. Whereas African science was on the decline during the last two decades of the previous millennium, there is 
now abundant evidence that scientific output is increasing, that Africa’s share of world scientific papers has grown signifi-
cantly and that international research collaboration has increased substantially. These changes are occurring at the same 
time as international funding of research in Africa is increasing - especially in the fields of health, environmental sciences 
and some aspects of agricultural sciences. Our analysis of these trends, however, also shows that there remain areas of 
concern and challenge, viz. the low investment by African governments themselves in (public) Research and Development 
(R&D) and thus the continued reliance by many countries and universities on foreign funding.  
We highlight some of the structural effects the various new funding arrangements have had on scientific research in Africa. 
We point to three already visible effects: (1) the absolute need to involve national institutions in any new funding landscape; 
(2) the effects on governance arrangements amidst the increasing complexity of multi-lateral, multi-actor funding frame-
works; and (3) the yet largely unknown effects that funding configurations may have on the careers of scientists (especially 
young scientists) on the continent. 
We then discuss three structural constraints of research in Africa: (1) the essential role of universities as the main loci for 
research in Africa; (2) the challenge about investing in research activities in order to promote excellent research; (3) the 
priority to address the challenges related to employment and the circulation of scientists (in the wake of decades of emi-
grations of scientists and highly skilled workers). 
We conclude with a summary overview of the political economy of research in Africa today. We remind the reader of the 
positive trends in the ‘rise’ of African science, but at the same time make some cautionary notes about the remaining  
challenges. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Although some serious academic research has 
been conducted on the dynamics and trends in Af-
rican research systems since at least the early 
eighties, there is still a long way if we want to sat-
isfy Kofi Annan’s claim at the Higher Education 
Summit, Dakar, March 2015: “We need empiri-
cally-based, data-informed decision-making in 
Africa in order to improve governance and 
productivity”. Systematic efforts to collect and  
analyse data on research in Africa have been led by 
very few research teams such as in South Africa 
(SciSTIP)1 or in France (CEPED unit)2. “Science in 
Africa” coordinated by R. Waast and J. Gaillard in 
1998-2000 was the first European study to pro-
duce a pan-African overview of African research 
systems3 (Waast & Gaillard, 2001). Before this 
project, most studies were restricted to  
scientometric and policy analyses. 
 
a Centre Population & Développement (Ceped), Université Paris Descartes, IRD, France. 
b Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology (CREST) and Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Sci-
ence, Technology and Innovation Policy (SciSTIP), South Africa. 
1 In particular, the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology (CREST), now part of the consortium SciS-
TIP, DST-NDR Centre of Excellence in Scientometrics and Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy. 
http://www0.sun.ac.za/crest/ 
2 Research Team on Science and Education, IRD-CEPED, Paris, formerly known as “Savoir et Développement”, now “Educa-
tion, Science, and Knowledge”. http://www.ceped.org/en/research-teams/article/team-3-family-and-education. 
3 South Africa, Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon, Madagascar, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mozambique. 
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PREAMBLE: A FEW WORDS ON EXISTING DATA SOURCES
Science, technology, and higher education has  
received increasing attention in Africa with a con-
comitant increase in the number of studies.4 
Nonetheless, there is still a dearth of social anal-
yses of higher education or science and technology 
when compared to Latin America (in particular 
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Colombia) and 
Asia (India, China, Taiwan, Singapore).  
One effort to fill this gap occurred in 2006 when 
CREST (Centre for Research on Evaluation,  
Science and Technology) and IRD (French Insti-
tute for Development Research) teams joined 
forces in 2006 to produce a large meta-study on 55 
middle-income countries (Mouton & Waast, 
2008) which provided an overview of a variety of 
factors that affect the STI policies as well as their 
social embeddedness. This large study has gener-
ated some important clues on the way science 
works under adverse social, political and eco-
nomic conditions in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa. Another important initiative to improve 
data on African science system, under the auspices 
of New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD), has been the African Science and Tech-
nology Innovation Indicators Initiative (ASTII). 
This initiative informed a regional report titled 
the African Innovation Outlook (2010), concerning 
19 countries, followed by a 2014 edition including 
35 countries in the analysis (NEPAD, 2014).  
SciSTIP continues to monitor the scientific pro-
duction on the African continent.  
African research production has been the subject 
of a number of bibliometric studies, since the first 
systematic use of a multidisciplinary database (the 
French defunct PASCAL) (Arvanitis, Waast, & 
Gaillard, 2000), followed by a first study using the 
SCI (Science Citation Index today known as Web 
of science) (Narváez-Berthelemot, Russell, 
Arvanitis, Waast, & Gaillard, 2002) that was done 
for the “Science in Africa” project at IRD. This early 
work showed a rather elusive research activity, 
and an uncertain institutional environment. 
Later, a comprehensive analysis based on SCI 
by)Robert Tijssen (2007) at the University of Lei-
den Centre for Science and Technology Studies 
showed that sub-Saharan Africa had fallen dra-
matically behind in its share of world science 
production. More recent work done by CREST 
for the African Innovation Report 2010 (Mouton 
& Boshoff, 2010), or a report commissioned by the 
World Bank (2014) to Elsevier on the Scopus da-
tabase has shown a growth of the production. 
Other researchers have produced similar studies 
(Confraria, 2014; Pouris & Ho, 2013) and the last 
World Science Report of UNESCO (2015) confirms 
the data as reported by the Web of Science. For 
the needs of this Working Paper, we use our own 
analysis of the data.5 
 
THE DECLINE OF UNIVERSITY RESEARCH IN AFRICA IN THE LATE 1990S AND EARLY 
MILLENNIUM 
Various international forces associated with  
globalization and internationalization of trade in 
the 1980s and 1990s had a devastating effect on 
the economies of many African countries: the de-
cline in export volumes as well as the relative 
 
4 And need to be consolidated. One such intent is the 
South African consortium SciSTIP leadered by CREST at 
Stellenbosch University, includes many other specialists 
in the field. A special mention should be made of an 
eight-year project (HERANA) studying the diversification 
of research universities in Africa. Other specialists in Af-
rica are working on Universities such as Damtew 
Teferra, scholar from Ethiopia and now professor at 
University of Kwazulu-Natal, in Durban, South Africa, 
and Paul Seleza in Kenya, among others.  
decline in the price of primary products in world 
trade, combined with the mishandling of ex-
change rates and of external reserves, and the huge 
external overhanging debt created together major 
resource gaps for the countries of Africa. This put 
5 Interactive data visible on-line: production in the Web 
of science of the main science producers in Africa. Ac-
cessible at http://www.beep.ird.fr/cop/cop_liste.php 
A general graphic shows all the countries. The user can 
select a specific country from  the legend of  the general 
graphic and add or eliminate a country. Data concern 
overall production, evolution of co-publications and 
main co-publishing partner country. Analysis and de-
sign by Pier Luigi Rossi, IRD, Bondy.  
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serious pressure on their import capacity and the 
availability of resources for essential economic 
and social investment. The result was an increased 
dependence of the typical sub-Saharan African 
country on aid from the developed countries.  
At the same time international agencies, most  
notably the World Bank, decided to privilege ex-
penditure on basic education at the expense of 
support for higher education (Psacharopoulos, 
Tan, & Jimenez, 1986). This policy position was 
based on two premises. The first was the belief 
that the return on investment in primary and  
secondary education are higher than those in 
higher education. The second reason related to 
concerns with equity and access to basic education 
which would naturally lead to an emphasis on  
primary education. The result was quite predicta-
ble with many universities thrown into financial 
crisis, laboratories and libraries not receiving any 
maintenance, overcrowded lecture rooms and 
huge flight of the top academics from these  
institutions.  
Research and scholarship would be one of the 
main losers during these years. Africa’s share of 
world science, as measured in papers published in 
the citation indexes of the Web of Science  
declined steadily over this period. Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s share of world scientific papers declined 
from one percent in 1987 to 0.7 percent in 1996 
(Tijssen, 2007). This diminishing share of African 
science overall did not reflect a decrease in  
absolute sense, but rather an increase in publica-
tion output less than the worldwide growth rate. 
Africa had lost 11 percent of its share in global sci-
ence since its peak in 1987; sub-Saharan science 
had lost almost a third (31 percent). The countries 
in Northern Africa, Egypt and the Maghreb coun-
tries (Algeria, Mauritania, Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia) accounted for the modest growth of the 
African share of the worldwide output during the 
years 1998-2002 (Mouton & Boshoff, 2010). 
Numerous case studies covering the period be-
tween 1990 and 2005 demonstrated quite 
convincingly that research at former well-re-
sourced institutions such as Makerere University 
in Uganda, University of Ibadan in Nigeria and 
University of Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania had de-
teriorated; that research infrastructure and the 
general state of laboratories at many institutions 
had suffered from a lack of maintenance and 
timely replacement of old equipment6. The cumu-
lative effect of the funding policies of the last two 
decades of the previous millennium, the huge 
growth in student enrolments in higher education 
institutions, combined with continuing political 
instability in many African countries created a 
state of affairs which Johann Mouton (2008) de-
scribed as the “de-institutionalization” of science. 
 
THE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS IN AFRICA  
In a modern science system there are typically a 
multitude of scientific institutions that perform 
clearly articulated functions and roles, and  
together constitute what could be termed the “na-
tional mode of scientific production” (Waast & 
Krishna, 2003). The “national mode” means that 
science is conducted for the public good and that 
the direction of science is shaped and steered by 
the nation’s most pressing socio-economic needs. 
It also implies that the State accepts that it has a 
major responsibility for financing research and 
 
6 The World Bank strategy in Africa had the effect of de-
linking universities from development. In addition, it led 
to development policies that had negative consequences 
for African nations and their sustainable development 
potential. Neglect of higher education led to the dises-
tablishment of research centres, medical schools, 
development activities (Jacques Gaillard, Hassan, 
Waast, & Schaffer, 2002; Jacques Gaillard, 
Krishna, & Waast, 1997).  
Historically, in the developing world, this regime 
of knowledge production was initiated after the 
independences, under a general paradigm of the 
developmentalist state, and very much linked to 
the way the states themselves managed national 
agricultural centres, telecommunication and technologi-
cal development, business training centres, vocational 
schools and other areas in the higher education sector, 
which are critical to the development of African societies 
and their economies.(Cloete, Bailey, Pillay, Bunting, & 
Maassen, 2011, p.7)  
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affairs.7 Many of the practices in managing  
resources adopted in the colonial periods, namely 
the management of society and natural resources 
as objects of colonial rule without active participa-
tion of the various social groups, were persistent 
throughout the post-independence days 
(Bonneuil, 2000) and still are in some medical 
practices (Vinh-Kim, 2010).  
The long (debt) crisis period before the new Mil-
lennium made the acceptance of knowledge 
production even more difficult, as well as it evi-
denced the fragility of the academic work and lack 
of confidence not only by authoritarian govern-
ments (El-Kenz, 1997; Hanafi & Arvanitis, 2016), 
but also by societies themselves; it created a weak 
“social inscription of science”, a concept suggested 
by Roland Waast (2006). Science needs to be em-
bedded in a close relation to the elites of a country, 
but also in relation to social groups that can ex-
press their need for scientific knowledge. This 
“social contract”, or its absence, explains well the 
differences that exist among middle-income 
countries as far as research policy and efforts to 
develop their capacities are concerned (Mouton & 
Waast, 2009).  
At the time of these studies, it was concluded that 
few or none of the features of modern science sys-
tems applied to most countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Scientific institutions in these countries 
remained fragile and susceptible to the vagaries of 
political and military upheavals. They were se-
verely under-resourced and suffered because of a 
lack of clarity and articulation of science govern-
ance issues (demonstrated by constant shifts in 
ministerial responsibility for science). These sys-
tems were hugely dependent on international 
funding for R&D, the dominant mode of research 
was individualistic in nature rather than aimed at 
building institutional capacities and there was an 
inadequate reproduction of the scientific and aca-
demic workforce. 
 
REVERSING THE TREND IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 
More recent studies (Mouton & Boshoff, 2010; 
World Bank et al., 2014) show that the tide has 
turned and that scientific production in Africa has 
begun to increase substantially since the turn of 
the century. The annual output of scientific papers 
has been steadily increasing over the past decade, 
from 15,285 in 2005 to 54,069 in 20168 (Figure 1). 
Perhaps most striking is that this rate of increase 
has surpassed the world growth rates over the 
same period, with the result that Africa’s share of 
world publication output nearly doubled from 
1.5% in 2005 to 3.2% in 2016. With a smaller por-
tion of the world literature (usually labelled 
“mainstream science”), we can examine the rapid 
growth of the participation of Africa in the World 
production (Figure 2). 
Looking at these longer data series since 1988, we 
can better visualise the spectacular growth of the 
world share since 2003-2005 (Figure 3). It also 
shows that the dynamism of the continent is very 
much related to the growth of North-African 
countries (in particular Tunisia, Algeria and 
Egypt).  
 
  
 
7 The connection of the science policy to the general de-
velopment of the state and society is well analysed histo-
rically under the concept of regimes of knowledge pro-
duction proposed by Dominique Pestre (2003). For 
Europe and the USA, see the History of sciences and 
knowledge (in French), edited by the same historian 
(Pestre, 2015). 
8 Accessible at http://www.beep.ird.fr/cop/cop_liste.php  
See note 5, above. 
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Figure 1: Increase in Africa’s scientific articles and reviews (2005 – 2016) (Source: CA Web of Science – all 
collections) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Increase in Africa’s scientific total production in mainstream collection (1988 – 2017) (Source: 
Web of Science - SCI Expanded) 
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Figure 3: Evolution of world shares (All Africa, North Africa, Egypt and South Africa) 
 
Source: Web of Science – SCI Expanded, not including Social Science Index or Arts and Humanities Index – on-line series. 
Note: This subset from the Web of Science with a nearly constant set of journals allows for long-term comparisons. Data 
on the overall participation of African production is closer to 3,2% of World production in the Web of Science (articles and 
reviews). 
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ARTICLE OUTPUT BY COUNTRY  
Article output by country shows the continued 
dominance of South Africa, followed by strong 
contributions from Egypt and other North Afri-
can countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco), 
together with smaller but significant contribu-
tions from Nigeria and the three Eastern African 
countries (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania). The 
data also show how skewed the distribution of 
publication production on the African continent 
is. Thirteen countries having each contributed 1% 
or more of total output in the most recent 5-year 
period, account for 89% of all output. Today, 
North Africa represents 46% of all Africa’s output, 
and sub-Saharan Africa, 54%. Egypt represents 
25% and South Africa represents similarly 26.6% 
of Africa’s output (2015-2017, on SCI-Expanded).  
 
 
Figure 4: Total number of publications by country (2011 – 2015) 
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WHICH FIELDS OF RESEARCH? 
Out of the total of 273 scientific field categories in 
the Web of Science, Africa’s production is higher 
than the overall average (2.8%) in 86 fields. If one 
focuses on those fields which are both large in  
volume (more than 5 000 papers produced  
between 2005 and 2015), as well as contributing 
significantly to world output in those fields (all 
contributing more than 3% of world production), 
nine fields meet this criterion: Tropical  
medicine; Parasitology; Infectious diseases; 
Public, environmental and occupational 
health; Water resources; Ecology; Immunol-
ogy; Zoology and Plant sciences.  
These results reaffirm the fact that scientific pro-
duction often mirrors the material reality of a 
country or region: in this case, the biodiversity on 
the continent, as well as the imperative to invest 
much effort in studying the (tropical) and other 
diseases that plague many African countries. It 
also reveals the permanence of the colonial herit-
age: tropical medicine is a very strong domain in 
the UK and France, two major contributors to the 
co-authorship in African countries. 
Figure 5: Specialisation index by fields of science (2011 – 2015) 
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Africa’s relative field strength (RFS9) is in the  
Natural and Agricultural sciences: the only broad 
domains where the RFS Index value is above one. 
Africa is weakest in the broad domain of the Hu-
manities.  
The disaggregation of the Agricultural broad 
area shows that Africa is relatively strong in the 
field of Agricultural Economics and Policy (where 
it has increased its standing in the most recent pe-
riod). Africa is also relatively strong in Agronomy, 
Plant Sciences and Food Science and Technology 
– although its position in all three has weakened 
over time. Africa is not strong in Agricultural En-
gineering nor in Dairy and Animal science.  
In the broad area of Health sciences, it is clear that 
Africa is particularly active and strong in Parasit-
ology (a strength that has been sustained over the 
past ten years). Its relative activity in Andrology 
and Virology has also improved.  
The disaggregation of the broad field of Biologi-
cal Sciences shows that Africa is particularly 
active and strong in Entomology and Ornithology 
and to a lesser extent in Zoology, Biotechnology 
and Applied Sciences and Microbiology. How-
ever, in all of these fields, Africa has lost some 
ground in the more recent years.  
The disaggregation of the broad field of Physical 
Sciences shows that Africa is relatively strong in 
three related fields (Astronomy and Astrophysics; 
Particle Physics and Nuclear Physics).  
The disaggregation of the broad field of Earth 
Sciences shows that Africa is relatively strong 
across all sub-fields. Having said this, Africa has 
lost some ground in the most recent period in the 
fields of Water resources, Ecology and Mineral-
ogy. It remains strong in Geology.  
As far as the Social sciences and Humanities are 
concerned, the picture is less positive. Domains 
belonging to basic sciences, also useful in industry 
(industrial engineering, material sciences, bio-
technological processes, computer sciences) are 
rather neglected. The agenda, if we read it 
through the lens of publication outputs, is cer-
tainly reflecting the views of the hegemonic 
partners of Africa — those precise domains where 
North-South partnerships are dominant. 
 
ADVANTAGES AND CAVEATS ABOUT RESEARCH COLLABORATIONS 
African scientists increasingly collaborate with 
scientists elsewhere.10 Our analyses show that  
collaboration between countries on the continent 
is negligible. In addition, less than 10% of papers 
are single institution (no collaboration) papers. 
The vast majority of Africa’s papers fall into two 
categories: papers where the authors co-publish 
with institutions in the same country (national 
collaboration) which constitutes about 40% of all 
papers and papers where there is some collabora-
tion between Africa and the rest of the world 
(international collaboration which is about 50% of 
all papers). The trend is clearly in favour of the  
latter.  
  
 
9 One of the standard indicators used in bibliometric 
studies to measure whether a country (or region or insti-
tution) is particularly strong in a particular field, is the 
specialisation or activity index. We are not convinced 
that the term “activity” captures the notion of strength 
adequately. The term “specialisation” is equally problem-
atic as it is more often used in discussions about 
specialisation within disciplines. Because this index 
measures the “relative” strength of a particular field or 
discipline compared to others, we refer to as the “Rela-
tive field strength index”. A RFS value of 1 (indicated by a 
bold line in all graphs below) in a field or discipline im-
plies that this entity (country or region) has a world 
share for that field similar to its share in all fields com-
bined. This is a “neutral” situation meaning there is no 
relative strength in that particular field. When the RFS in-
dex is greater than 1, the country is said to be strong in 
that field, at the expense of some other fields or disci-
plines for which the index is less than 1. 
10 It is standard practice in bibliometric studies to use the 
co-authorship relationships of journal articles as a meas-
ure of research collaboration. We analysed different 
categories of research collaboration (as measured by co-
authorship patterns) in articles where there is at least 
one author from an African country. 
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Figure 6: Africa publication collaboration profiles (2005 – 2015) (Source: Web of Science articles and re-
views, all collections) 
 
 
The increasing number of co-authorships (world-
wide) should not be left without questioning. First 
we note large variations from one country to an-
other. Not only do smaller countries tend to have 
higher collaboration proposals, but also collabora-
tions are related to policy choices. Thus, for 
instance, Turkey, China, Brazil have much lower 
levels of foreign co-authorship (Jacques Gaillard, 
2010), and in the three cases it is a choice to pro-
mote national publications that are reflected in the 
output measured by bibliometrics. Waast and 
Gaillard (2017) note that shares of internationally 
co-authored papers have increased in very high 
proportions in the last thirty years in all African 
countries. In some cases, as mentioned by N. 
Boshoff (2009), the proportion of foreign co-au-
thored papers is very high (more than 80% in 
scientifically “small” countries of Central Africa) 
and a survey of African co-authors showed they 
were rather in charge of empirical fieldwork and 
data collection (Boshoff, 2009).  
Another important element needs to be empha-
sized: the emergence of large international 
endeavours translating into a high volume of pub-
lications with an extensive list of co-authors from 
various countries, most of whom don’t even know 
each other or have not ever collaborated together. 
A large part of the increase of the production (yet 
to be calculated) relates to these “big science” pro-
jects such as international health projects in 
Global Health, or very large particle physics pro-
jects such as ATLAS (Yami, Nordberg, 
Nicquevert, & Boisot, 2011). M. Kahn (2018) 
shows that in the case of South Africa, the surge 
of international co-authorship is the results 
mostly of these collaborative projects rather than 
active cooperation and partnerships.  
These megaprojects blur the distinction between 
genuine collaborations among researchers and re-
search units that indeed have worked together and 
the participation in large collaborative networks, 
funded globally, where units contribute to the 
knowledge base without necessarily being inter-
connected. Finally, from the point of view of 
researchers, in some cases international coopera-
tion can be seen as “time-consuming, costly and 
often one-side”, as was the case in a survey of so-
cial sciences researchers in South Africa (CREST, 
2014, p. 53). Although this might appear as 
strange and counterintuitive, it relates to the 
framework in which collaborations take place. 
Collaborations are welcome when they are the 
product of initiatives “from the ground”, or fol-
lowing tracks of well-established former contacts, 
with no important additional effort to be made. 
When levels of training and types of interroga-
tions are very different, entailing some important 
effort in mutual understanding, collaborations 
will usually be rejected. 
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INVESTMENTS BY AFRICAN GOVERNMENTS IN (PUBLIC) R&D 
Many African governments have committed 
themselves to increasing their gross domestic ex-
penditure on R&D (GERD). GERD is generally 
regarded as a measure of how dedicated a specific 
country is to supporting research. But the reality 
is that most sub-Saharan Africa countries spend 
less than 0.5% of their gross domestic product 
(GDP) on R&D. Nigeria, for example, lags far be-
hind in that only 0.20% of its GDP is assigned 
towards the development of R&D (African Inno-
vation Outlook 2010, p. 37). Unfortunately, not all 
sub-Saharan Africa  countries’ GERD is captured 
in the statistics below (Table 1). We lack therefore 
a comprehensive view of GERD in the region. In 
South Africa, the R&D Survey notes that “this ra-
tio (GERD/GDP) has stagnated between 1.4 and 
1.5 over the previous seven years” (HSRC, 2014, 
p. xiii).  
 
Table 1. Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) 
Country African Innovation Outlook UNESCO↑ Insti-
tute for 
Statistics 
Year GERD 
Million PPPS 
GERD per capita 
PPPS 
GERD as % of 
GDP 
GERD as % of 
GDP 
Botswana 2005 n/a n/a 0.38 0.52 (2005) 
Burkina Faso 2009 n/a n/a 0.18 0.20 (2009) 
Cameroon n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Côte d’Ivoire n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Ethiopia 2005 n/a n/a 0.2 0.24 (2010) 
Ghana 2008 78.7 58.3 0.47 0.23 (2007) 
Kenya 2007 277.8 7.4 0.38 0.42 (2007) 
Malawi 2007 180.1 12.9 1.70 n/a 
Mozambique*‡ 2007 42.9 2.0 0.25 0.47 (2010) 
Namibia 2005 n/a n/a 0.3 n/a 
Nigeria*† 2007 583.2 3.9 0.20 0.22 (2007) 
Senegal 2008 99.0 8.0 0.48 0.37 (2008) 
South AfricaΩ 2010/11 4976.6 102.4 0.76 0.87 (2009/10) 
Tanzania* 2007 234.6 5.8 0.48 n/a 
Uganda† 2007 359.8 11.6 1.10 0.41 (2009) 
Zambia 2008 55.3 4.6 0.37 0.34 (2008) 
Zimbabwe 2005 n/a n/a 0.2 n/a 
Source: African Innovation Outlook (2010: 34) 
* Data do not include the business enterprise sector 
† Data do not include private non-profit institutions/organisations 
‡ Data do not include the higher education sector 
Ω HSRC CESTII Report (August 2013) 
↑We have added an additional column to include the latest available UIS statistics on R&D investment for selected countries 
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RELIANCE ON FOREIGN FUNDING 
The second Africa Innovation Outlook (2014) pub-
lished data on Africa’s GERD by funding sources 
for six countries that completed the R&D survey 
for the report. Government funding of R&D ac-
tivities is significant, albeit at very low levels in 
real money terms. Notably Ghana’s government 
expenditure in R&D is the highest accounting for 
68% of its research expenditure. Ghana also rec-
ords the lowest expenditure from its business 
sector at 0.1% in 2010. In the majority of the six 
countries, contributions from the business/pri-
vate sector are low. The outlier is South Africa, 
where the private sector contributes over 40% of 
the total R&D expenditure. South Africa was also 
the least reliant on foreign funding with only 12% 
of funding being from outside sources. The Africa 
Outlook indicates that some countries such as 
Mozambique, Burkina Faso and Uganda received 
more than 50% of their R&D funding from foreign 
sources (Figure 7). 
To illustrate this over-reliance on foreign fund-
ing, the figure below reflects the sources of 
funding for Makerere University, Uganda’s flag-
ship university (Hydén, 2017, p.97) (figure 8). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of international funding for R&D by country (2010 or latest year) 
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Figure 8: Source of R&D funding at Makerere University (2000 – 2012) 
 
 
 
Of all of Makerere’s funders over the 12-year  
period between 2000 and 2012 reflected above, 
the Uganda National Council for Science and 
Technology was the only local funder.11 Makerere 
University has sustained much of its research ac-
tivities through the assistance of external funders 
among which two European countries (Norway 
and Sweden), the USA, two foundations and the 
EU. 
 
DIFFERENT CONFIGURATIONS OF NATIONAL POLICY AND FUNDING 
Science granting councils (SGCs) and agencies 
with equivalent missions such as national com-
missions for science and technology, national 
science councils and national academies of science 
 
11 Over this 12-year period UNCST gave a total of US$1 
245 898 directly and also US$ 2 134 453 through the Mil-
lennium Science Initiative (MSI), a programme funded 
mainly by/through the World Bank (2016) 
are essential actors in a country’s systems of inno-
vation. In well-defined and clearly articulated 
systems of innovation they perform a number of 
crucial functions that contribute to the effective 
and efficient functioning of such systems. Ideally, 
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such councils act as fair and disinterested agents of 
government while, at the same time, representing 
the interests of the scientific community nation-
ally, regionally and internationally. Thus, they are 
crucial ‘intermediaries’ in the flow of international 
funding and technical support to R&D-perform-
ing institutions in a country. The creation of 
Science Granting Councils and Competitive Re-
search Funds is of a rather recent origin in sub-
Saharan Africa. Over the past decade, however, 
we have seen an increase in either the establish-
ment of dedicated science granting councils or 
agencies or the promulgation of policies stipulat-
ing that such agencies must be established in the 
foreseeable future. An empirical study by CREST 
examined the strategic priorities, objectives and 
practices of SGCs in 17 sub-Saharan African 
countries12 (Mouton, Gaillard, & van Lill, 2014, 
2015).  
One of the main findings of this study on Science 
councils in Africa relates to the wide range and  
diversity of science funding configurations in the 
selected countries. Using the widely-accepted 
principal-agent framework, a number of  
questions presented themselves concerning the 
power relations and the distribution of tasks  
between the funding organisation and the princi-
pal organisation that it reports to. Box 1 shows 
three examples of how these questions are ad-
dressed quite differently in each country. In the 17 
countries investigated, four models capture the 
most commonly found organisational arrange-
ments for public research funding.  
The paradigmatic Principal-Agent model 
It is the simplest manifestation of the principal-
agent principle at work, where the government 
delegates its responsibility, as far as science or re-
search funding is concerned, to a (relatively) 
autonomous body – usually referred to as a Na-
tional Research/Science Foundation or Council. 
Although such a Foundation or Council receives 
its funds directly from the government and has to 
account for it on a regular basis (usually annually), 
it derives its autonomy through a statutory act of 
establishment and the appointment of a separate 
 
12 This study was funded by the International Develop-
ment Research Centre (IDRC) in 2012. 
Board or Council. This Council then establishes 
the required structures, policies and procedures to 
ensure fair, transparent and efficient disburse-
ment of funds to public universities and research 
organisations. 
Foundations would typically establish different 
“funding instruments” (scholarships, bursaries, 
travel grants, grants for emerging and established 
scholars, capacity-building grants and so on) to 
give effect to their mission. The best example of 
the paradigm case is the South African National 
Research Foundation. It was established in 1998 as 
a statutory body with its own council. It receives 
its funding from Treasury via the Department of 
Science and Technology and disburses this money 
through a wide range of funding instruments to 
South African universities on a competitive basis. 
Mozambique also has a similar configuration in 
that the NRF is directly responsible to the Minis-
try of Science and Technology. Other countries 
with similar arrangements are Senegal, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Namibia. 
The sector-differentiated model 
In many countries we found sector-specific fund-
ing agencies. In most cases funding agencies for 
agriculture and health (the two most common 
domains) have developed separately over time, 
usually reflecting the priority afforded to research 
in these two areas in most African countries. In 
addition, sector-specific agencies have their roots 
in inter-departmental rivalries and vested  
interests, which led governments to establish dif-
ferent research funding councils or foundations 
for different sectors in the science system (a usual 
case concerns telecommunications, as in Morocco 
and Egypt). We refer to this as the sector-differ-
entiated model. A good example is the South 
African case where three bodies have a statutory 
responsibility for research funding: the National 
Research Foundation (which reports to the De-
partment of Science and Technology), the 
Medical Research Council (which reports to 
the Department of Health) and the Water  
Research Commission (which reports to the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry). With 
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this configuration, it is not surprising to find that 
the funding agencies report to the different “prin-
cipals” within Government. This fact, in itself, 
often causes challenges around co-ordination in 
science funding in the science system. Burkina 
Faso has three funding agencies which report di-
rectly to their respective ministries: FONRID 
reports to the Ministry of Scientific Research and 
Innovation; FONER is responsible to the Ministry 
of Secondary and Higher Education; while FARES 
reports to the Ministry of Health. 
 
In Ghana, the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) coordinates and administers the oper-
ations of the Science and Technology Research Endowment Fund (STREFund). The STREFund is an 
independent funding mechanism. One mechanism by which the Ministry of Environment, Science and 
Technology (principal) ensures that the CSIR (agent) is serving the interests of government in its admin-
istration of the fund is through co-representation. The STREFund is governed by a board of trustees of 
nine persons representing the CSIR, the Association of Ghana Industries, the Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Planning, universities, the National Council for Tertiary Education, the Ghana Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, and the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission. At the same time, it could be argued that the repre-
sentative board is also a mechanism by which the fund itself (as a second layer agent) satisfies the interests 
of the CSIR as its immediate principal. 
Tanzania: The Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) (the agent) is a govern-
ment institution under the Ministry of Communication, Science and Technology (the principal). The 
National Fund for the Advancement of Science and Technology is located within the structure of 
COSTECH. The fund is an inter-ministerial fund channelled by the Treasury through the Ministry of Com-
munication, Science and Technology. The fund is administered by an inter-ministerial and multi-sectoral 
committee, which comprises representatives of the relevant ministries (President’s Office, Treasury, Plan-
ning Commission, Communication, Science), the Bank of Tanzania, the National University, the Chamber 
of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry, and the Director General of COSTECH. Thus, through represen-
tation on the committee, the government, as principal, can ensure that COSTECH, as primary agent, is 
executing the fund in a manner that meets the national interest. 
In Zambia, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) (agent) administers the Strategic Re-
search Fund on behalf of the Department of Science and Technology in the Ministry of Education, Science, 
Vocational Training and Early Education (the principal). The mechanism by which the Ministry ensures 
that the NSTC serves the national interest in the administration of the fund is through dual fund manage-
ment. The Strategic Research Fund is managed by two committees: the Technical Committee of the NSTC 
and the Fund Management Committee of the Ministry. 
 
The embedded principal-agent model 
A different configuration of the paradigmatic case 
is the embedded principal-agent model. Here the 
“agent” is not institutionally separate from the 
government (Ministry or Department of Science 
and Technology/ Higher Education). This was la-
belled as the “embedded agent” as the “agent” is 
organisationally part and parcel of a government 
department. In cases such as these, it is typical that 
the “agent” is (1) either a sub-department or direc-
torate within a Ministry or Department of S&T; 
or (2) a Fund/ Funding Programme that is admin-
istered by a department. Here the agent is simply 
an extension of government with no obvious au-
tonomy or independence from the department in 
which it is located. One could argue that the agent, 
under this model, is not a proper “agent” (as sug-
gested by the principal-agent framework) as it acts 
more as a commissioning agency than a disbursing 
agency. In fact, one of the best examples of the 
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“embedded-agent” model is that of COSTECH in 
Tanzania – the Commission for Science and 
Technology. In two other countries (Namibia 
and Rwanda) these funding agencies are also re-
ferred to as “commissions”.  
 
MULTIPLE PRINCIPAL-AGENTS MODEL (NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FUNDERS) 
This configuration can be labelled the “multiple 
principal-agents” model since additionally to the 
funding that is channelled from government (via 
some council or fund) to the universities, there are 
also various other “principals” at work in the na-
tional science system. These are typically 
international funders, foundations and develop-
ment agencies, not necessarily specialised in 
research, but rather development agencies,13 who 
all channel funds predominantly to universities 
and research institutes, but also to NGOs14 in  
African countries. In practice, we find many vari-
ations of this configuration, where many 
“principals” (national and foreign) co-exist (like 
“parallel universes”) in the same system. The  
review also found very little or no co-ordination 
or interaction between these separate funding 
channels. Such a situation obviously raises many 
questions: about priority setting, parallel lines of 
reporting and accounting, duplication, and so on. 
It is also to be found in international organisa-
tions, as will be mentioned below.  
 
THE COMPLEX GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL FUNDING 
In a recent report on North-South research part-
nerships, J. Dodson (2017) selected eleven 
programmes funded mainly by UK institutions as 
well as US, Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, and the 
Netherlands. This report can be read as an exten-
sive analysis of the hybrid models of multiple 
principals-multiple agents. Dodson proposes to 
classify these partnerships by management struc-
tures, not based on the type of connection of the 
funding agent in its relation to the principal insti-
tutional actor, but rather on the distribution and 
partnering of roles in funding and management 
and the location of the management of the  
programme: Africa or in the foreign country.  
Thus, Dodson examines five main models of in-
volvement of funders (her analysis excluded 
entirely national funding, which was the main  
focus of the SGCs study mentioned above). Con-
cretely the role of funders —the main object of her 
analysis— depends less upon this complexity than 
other structural aspects (experience in research 
type of activities allowed, the objectives such as 
capacity building, learning and monitoring activi-
ties, the development of a critical mass…), the 
management of the selection and evaluation  
process, the financial rulings… Moreover, the un-
derlying question of all the analysis is how to 
combine national authorities with “Northern” 
agencies and international funding agencies. 
 
  
 
13 AFD (France), EU, SIDA (Sweden), CIDA, Wellcome, GTZ 
(GIZ), Danida (Denmark), NORAD (Norway), DFID (UK), 
Australia AID, USAID, DAAD (Germany), Carnegie Corpo-
ration of New York, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller 
Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates, PEPFAR, World Bank, 
and many others. 
14 A most striking example is in Tanzania the Health and 
Care for Mother and Child which is entirely outsources to 
a UK-based NGO (Hunsmann, 2016). 
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Figure 9: Dodson’s (2017) five models of involvement of research funders 
 
 
 
The variety of funding sources is not new. In a 
study carried out at the beginning of the last dec-
ade (Jacques Gaillard & Furó Tullberg, 2001a), 214 
sources of foreign funding supporting research ac-
tivities in sub-Saharan Africa were identified 
through a survey of African scientists. The main 
funding sources by far measured in number of 
project occurrences were USAID, the European 
Union, the French Cooperation, and WHO fol-
lowed by IDRC, FAO, AUPELF/UREF, IAEA, the 
World Bank and UNESCO, in other words mainly 
international organisations, or institutions spe-
cialised in “research for development” of the so-
called donor countries. Twenty years later, the 
analysis of actual funders today draws a very dif-
ferent and complex15 landscape. 
 
15 As one such analysis of funding mentions: “Donor 
funding for higher education and research is complex 
and difficult to fully map and understand. Donors use 
different classifications and categories, which makes it 
tricky to identify funding flows and where these go” 
(Hydén, 2017, p.2). 
The growing importance of private funding  
First, private foundations are dominating the 
scene: they are richer than public funders (even 
those from their own countries) (OECD, 2018) 
and they have defined their domains of preference 
mainly in the areas of health (Nwaka et al., 2012), 
tropical diseases and epidemics (Head et al., 2017), 
in the wave of research for global health16. Large 
private philanthropic funding sources have pro-
vided funds through international bodies such as 
the WHO, that has earmarked nearly 80% of its 
budget, whereby donors designate how their “vol-
untary” contributions are to be spent17. As the 
OECD (2018) notes “while modest in volume 
compared with ODA [Official Development Aid], 
foundations are significant players in the health 
16 Nwaka et al. (2012) derived a list of funders from 119 
applications for the selection as Centre of Excellence in 
health innovation.  
17 E.g. WHO’s 2018-2019 proposed budget of US$ 4.421 
billion is financed with US$ 3.465 billion (78%) from vol-
untary contribution, mainly philanthropic organisations 
and the rest form core contributions of member states. 
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and reproductive health sectors, where they were 
the third largest source of financing for develop-
ing countries behind the United States and The 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Ma-
laria. […] An OECD survey found that private 
foundations provided USD 23.9 billion from 2013 
to 2015, averaging USD 7.96 billion per year 
(OECD, 2018). Eighty-one per cent of these funds 
came from just 20 foundations. The Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation is the most significant 
of the 143 foundations surveyed, providing 49% of 
total philanthropic finance. Its aid has risen over 
the past five years by nearly 50% in real terms, 
reaching over USD 3 billion in 2016. Middle-in-
come countries received 67% of country allocable 
philanthropic funding and just one-third bene-
fited the Less Developped Countries. Almost all 
funding (97%) was implemented through inter-
mediary institutions. Africa was the largest 
beneficiary region, receiving about a third of this 
aid.” The OECD suggests that “official” donors 
(DAC members) could engage more systemati-
cally with private foundations. Many initiatives, 
in particular in health, are also a blend of private 
and public funding, as for e.g. the African Bi-
osafety Network of Expertise (BMG funding).  
Private funding is changing the very notion of 
“agenda-setting” (Vessuri, 2017). The old para-
digm of scientists defining the areas of funding 
and research, based on their research experience is 
mediated by the dynamics of large funding (phil-
anthropic) bodies that are supposed to convey 
research to comply major societal needs. Also, 
large private funders tend to now associate either 
to multi-lateral bodies such as WHO (Chorev, 
2012) and multi-agency funding schemes.  
Co-constructed, co-owned and co-funded 
Secondly, “donors” (institutions in country mem-
bers of the Development Assistance Committee) 
were defining, once, the agenda as part of their 
participation to aid policy. Donors select the 
countries they worked with, because of political 
affinities and the colonial past (Jacques Gaillard, 
1999), as well as because of diplomatic relations 
with other donors —usually all members of the 
 
18 http://www.ace.edu.ng/ace/about/ 
small club of the Development Aid Committee. 
Today, in the era of co-construction, few funding 
agencies would choose to work alone, without en-
gaging in some form of common engagement 
with local authorities. Moreover, “cost-sharing” is 
actively promoted by the World Bank, and en-
couraged by the OECD, that is public-private 
partnerships are supposed to be the best way for-
ward. Donors and foreign agencies do not any 
more provide technical assistance or even re-
search funds. They participate in the design and 
delivery of policy instruments, under the assump-
tion that “co-constructed”, “co-owned”, “co-
funded” policy measures between foreign partners 
and national performers and policy bodies will 
have a better chance to create a space for scientific 
research. This has been particularly the case for 
the European Union through its projects devoted 
to promote international collaborations through 
funding available to science policy institutions and 
partnering projects (called INCO projects for IN-
ternational COllaboration). Thus agencies and 
Science Councils in their relations to foreign part-
ners, although not very rich, play a key role in 
linking this external, global environment to the 
national needs. 
Funding through large initiatives 
A third change is that large ‘initiatives’ are now the 
name of the game. Programmes aimed at multi-
annual support, and seeking to produce an impact 
through the sheer weight of concentrated re-
sources have led to the idea of ‘centres of 
excellence’ and large networking initiatives com-
bining public and private sources of funding as 
well as various types of institutions. A number of 
initiatives have been instigated to create research 
centers (such as AIMS). The general idea here is 
to promote “clusters of knowledge” that would 
produce a concentration of resources in a single 
location, allowing for the exchange of ideas, profit 
from common investments and define shared 
agendas.  
The best well known such initiative, the African 
Centres of Excellence18, was launched in April 
2014 by the World Bank. Topics range from 
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health to environment, as well as some fields like 
materials, oil chemistry, applied mathematics and 
computer sciences. These centers have trained 
around 3000 faculty personnel inside the centers, 
and more than 2500 faculty nationals from these 
countries or from African countries (World Bank 
data19). A second series of 24 centres was launched 
in 2014 for Western and Central Africa, with 19 
centres of excellence selected across seven coun-
tries. 
Additionally, in 2012, the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU / UEMOA)  
designated 14 centres of excellence. Their focus is 
on quite different topics than the Word Bank 
funded centres (education studies, demographics, 
justice, business, management and economics, ur-
ban studies as well as water and environment. 
Most of these centers receive national and foreign 
funding, the latter being usually the main source. 
The process of selecting and approving these  
excellence centres has been documented in the 
case of 32 Centres of Excellence in health (Nwaka 
et al., 2012). 
All these excellence centres may have differing 
mandates, but they all participate in training re-
searchers (Masters and PhDs), establishing 
partnerships with national and foreign universi-
ties, and businesses as well as creating synergies at 
the sub-regional level (equipment, etc…), or  
promoting management and governance models 
that are supposed to be “role models” for the part-
nering universities.  
An important initiative of the EU is the Euro-
pean & Developing Countries Clinical Trials 
Partnership (EDCTP) concerning research, de-
velopment and testing of new medicines against 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis. EDCTP1 
has supported 196 research projects, including 57 
clinical trials involving more than 100.000  
patients. It has also helped to train more than 300 
African scientists. The EDTCP is in Phase two 
(since 2014) and is scheduled to receive EUR 2  
billions from the European Commission over the 
next ten years20. Calls for projects are co-funded 
 
19 http://projects.worldbank.org/P126974/strengthening-
tertiary-education-africa-through-africa-centers-excel-
lence?lang=en&tab=results accessed 27-07-2018 
20 http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/index.cfm?pg=africa 
by participating entities with the European Com-
mission.  
EDTCP is built on a provision of the Treaty of the 
Union in article 185, that allows for research to 
have multi-year programming with multiple part-
ners. Article 185 has also been used in 
partnerships with countries in the Baltic Sea (in-
cluding Russia), and more recently with PRIMA 
initiative that concerns Mediterranean  
neighbourhood countries.21 In the Med region, 
PRIMA has been negotiated while funding was 
channelled through two ERANET projects: 
ARIMNET in Agriculture and ERANET MED. 
The policy conditions and supporting activities 
were designed to be included in MED-SPRING 
which was an INCO project under FP7.22 
Bilateral programmes between North and 
South continue 
In addition to these large initiatives, the usual 
scholarship programmes (Marie Curie funding, 
Newton Fund, bi-lateral scholarships) and bilat-
eral cooperation schemes continue to exist.  
Other initiatives are more traditional, based on 
funding scholarships or grants to individuals. The 
Newton Fund, created in 2014, has been particu-
larly designated as a successful venture (Grimes & 
McNulty, 2016): it consists of bilateral partner-
ships between the UK and fifteen middle-income 
countries in order to provide appropriate frame-
works for support and funding opportunities.  
Within universities, various research-related ini-
tiatives can already be found. In Tanzania, 
cooperation between the Muhimbili University 
College of Health Sciences in Dar es Salaam, the 
University of Heidelberg (Germany) and GTZ in 
the early 2000s led to the introduction of a first 
Master of Public Health Programme. In South Af-
rica, remarkable achievements regarding the 
transformation of the higher education landscape 
were accomplished through the so-called ‘South 
Africa Norway Tertiary Education Programme’ 
(SANTED). Starting in 2000, it aimed at improv-
ing the access, retention and success of previously 
21 PRIMA will concern also North African countries (Egypt, 
Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco) and Middle East countries.  
22 MESDPRING was built among the same partners as 
MIRA (Morini, Rodriguez, Arvanitis, & Chaabouni, 2013). 
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disadvantaged students, enhancing the adminis-
trative and academic capacity of selected 
universities, and facilitating regional cooperation. 
When the programme formally ended in 2010, it 
had – despite a comparatively small amount of 
foreign investment – catalysed structural changes 
and institutional linkages spanning 16 universities 
in South Africa and the SADC region (Gibbon, 
2014). 
Less publicized in Anglophone literature, the 
French science diplomacy has used this scheme of 
bilateral funding since at least 30 years, expanding 
to today’s Programmes Hubert Curien, which are 
co-managed bilaterally by a French and national 
committee of the partnering country23. PHC are 
particularly active in North Africa and the Medi-
terranean region as well as in Africa and Latin 
America, and now Asia (67 PHC or similar pro-
grammes are currently under way with foreign 
partners. They account for over 2,000 projects 
every year). Long-time known by scientists in 
French-speaking countries, these programmes 
promote mobility rather than local capacity  
building.
 
VARIOUS STRUCTURAL EFFECTS OF FUNDING 
These changes discussed above have had various 
consequences, but three appear to be more im-
portant. 
1) The necessary involvement of national in-
stitutions. A first result has been the necessary 
relation with national institutions; institutions 
that, even if new or inefficient, are legitimate 
owners of policy areas in their country. As such 
they are the ‘natural’ partners of donors. In some 
cases, donors have to provide support in the crea-
tion of the policy-making institution. This is the 
case of the Millennium Science Initiative in 
Uganda (World Bank & IEG (Susan Ann Caceres), 
2016), a country where Donors finance approxi-
mately 30 percent of the government’s annual 
budget. The country with its newly reformed 
Ministry of Education, science, technology and 
sports, received US$ 16.69 million fund for re-
search grants, enhancing the education 
programmes, and create linkages between aca-
demia and industry. Not all cases are as strongly 
supported by global funders as in the case of 
Uganda, although this country, along with Tanza-
nia, stand out as the preferred investment 
countries for development funds related to re-
search. These investments are mainly in the health 
sector (Head et al., 2017) and for development aid 
activities (Hunsmann, 2016; Koch & Weingart, 
2016).  
2) Complex governance. A second consequence 
is that complex governance issues arise because of 
 
23 https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-pol-
icy/scientific-diplomacy/scientific-partnerships/ 
multilateral arrangements that are increasingly 
becoming the norm for the future. For manage-
ment needs, a foreign funding agency can choose 
to manage “on its side” specific funding schemes, 
or find solutions permitting to keep some control 
on funds even though participation of the national 
(local) funding entities have to be taken into  
account. But in no circumstance is it possible for a 
foreign agency, even a powerful one as the 
USAID, to pretend defining the agenda alone an-
ymore. The hybrid management practices become 
the norm. A striking example is the Japanese 
SATREPS: JIICA (the development agency) funds 
the local partners, while the Japan National Re-
search agency (JIST) and the Medical research 
council fund the Japanese partners.  
When working in large programmes with multi-
ple foreign sources of funding and some locally 
designed institution, where a national authority 
participates but as one among other agents, and 
not as a principal directing the system and its sub-
sequent funding, one could come-up with a hybrid 
embedded principal-agent model. All these hybrid 
cases of embedded principal-agent models pose 
governance issues and also raise questions as to 
who and how the funding should be directed.  
The multi-participations of different foreign 
funding agencies and Donors, affect directly the 
agenda-setting activities. They imply, more ofen 
than not, measure and analysis instruments. 
Cabane and Tantchou (2016), after editing a  
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collection of field studies of public-private, na-
tional/foreign interventions in Africa mention 
that “international donors no longer impose con-
ditions from the outside, but prefer to act from 
within African states through techniques, meas-
urements, standards, evaluation tools and specific 
terminology.” One can also see that foreign fun-
ders cannot avoid being embedded into common 
cooperation schemes with granting councils, 
those being necessary representatives of local po-
litical forces. 
J. Dodson (2017, p. 28), writing from a pragmatic 
point of view, that of North funders, mentions a 
series of efforts within partnerships addressing 
the “unequal power dynamics” : awarding letters 
sent to all grantees underlining that funding re-
sulted from joint successful bid with joint 
responsibilities, site visits from the funders to lo-
calities where funding is used; intensive 
communication from management people with 
project coordinators; creation of a specific finan-
cial management capacity in “r4d programme” 
(Swiss cooperation) and PEER (USAID) or direct 
administration support to grantees (IDRC); en-
couraging Southern leadership (example of Africa 
Capacity Building Initiative). 
3) Unknown effects on research careers. Fi-
nally, it should be mentioned that this new 
funding landscape has produced effects on the re-
search landscape and, as yet, are not properly 
understood. In a small country like Niger, among 
the poorest countries in Africa, which counts ap-
proximately 400 researchers, an analysis of 
acknowledgments in publications indexed in Web 
of Science (1995-2015) shows the strong presence 
of foreign funding from French research institu-
tions (20%), EU (13%), USA (13%), private 
foundations and NGOs (15.5%) among which 
BMG dominates with a variety of funding 
schemes (9.3%), international organisations like 
WHO, ICRISAT and other CGIAR centres (10%). 
National funding accounts for very few acknowl-
edgments (less than 2% of the papers) (Marou 
Sama, 2016).  
It is always mentioned by advocates of the various 
funding programmes that the effect can only be 
beneficial for developing countries but can be 
sometimes considered adverse for the “high-in-
come countries researchers” (Chu, Jayaraman, 
Kyamanywa, & Ntakiyiruta, 2014). These medical 
researchers state the challenge rather simply: 
“How can the advancement of African research ca-
pacity and academic careers be prioritized while 
satisfying the ‘publish or perish’ mandate of high-
income countries’ universities?” (p. 2). Most of the 
literature on the subject is rather normative and 
insists on the qualities that are supposed to be 
brought by cooperative partnerships.  
The impact of foreign funding on research careers 
has rarely been an object for study either in rich 
countries or in the developing world. But since 
the pioneering study of J.Gaillard (1991, first 
published in French in 1987), some surveys have 
shown that the impact of funding is extremely 
strong on careers. So much so, that the prevalent 
view in Africa was that one should follow the 
funding, thus entering in a sort of permanent pur-
suit for contracts as expert rather than researcher. 
Thus, entire careers in Academia could be built 
(Marou Sama, 2016) by securing simultaneously a 
close connection to some foreign individual re-
searcher and obtaining funds from calls and 
working as expert for international organisations 
(see the interview of Abdou Salam Fall in Dakar 
in Vidal, 2014). Recently, this bias has been un-
derlined in a survey on French-written literature 
on research on education in Africa, where the au-
thors (Gérard & Pilon, 2017) find many 
consultancy reports and relatively few research 
material. These authors see this change as a dan-
ger entailed by this short-term career-building; it 
seems that funders have taken into account this 
new way of professionalisation, and partly trans-
lates in these large initiatives. 
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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECT FOR CONSIDERATION
Nurturing research in Africa can be examined 
through many lenses. Here we will underline 
some structural constraints concerning invest-
ment and funding, employment, and the 
institutional framework of research in Africa.  
Universities as the main locus for research 
A reasonably well structured research system con-
tains various types of performing institutions: 
universities, public research organisation (PRO), 
private research organisations, R&D units of en-
terprises, NGOs, funding organisations (official, 
philanthropic foundations, etc.), “intermediate” 
organisations… The growing complexity of the 
research and innovation landscape should not 
conceal the fundamental role played by universi-
ties.  
Philip Altbach has insisted on the necessity to sus-
tain research universities in the developing 
countries. He has argued that universities are nei-
ther a luxury nor an unnecessary investment 
“Research universities provide the skills needed by 
twenty-first century economies and societies and 
reflect the best academic values. Research univer-
sities are central institutions for the global 
economy” (Altbach, 2009, p. 26). Like other think-
ers working on studies of higher education, he has 
been insisting on the fact that the power engine of 
the knowledge economy is universities.24 
It should be reminded that the defense of research 
universities in Africa in the eighties and nineties 
was contradicting directly the ideology that per-
meated most aid policies when the World Bank, 
after its 1986 “infamous report” (as described by 
N.Cloete), concluded that development efforts in 
Africa should be refocused to concentrate on pri-
mary education. It took more than ten years and 
the profound debt of Africa to change the whole 
view on universities. Today, there is growing con-
sensus on the necessity to promote research in 
 
24 This is better exposed by Altbach but numerous stud-
ies from such authors as M. Castells, J. Ziman, or N. Stehr 
offer abundant social and historical evidence of this fact. 
The metaphor of the “triple helix” (Etzkowitz & 
Leydesdorff, 1997), wider than that of the “entrepreneur-
ial university,” situates the contribution of the university 
universities, even though universities in Africa 
confront structural difficulties. 
Supporting research universities will not be a sim-
ple straightforward process. There are various 
reasons, among which the various roles of univer-
sities, as explained by Manuel Castells in his 
conferences in Africa (Muller, Cloete, & van 
Schalkwyk, 2016). Beyond the usual functions of 
training, research and dissemination (or third-
mission), Universities serve as producers of values 
and social legitimate knowledge, selection of the 
dominant elites, training of the educated labour 
force in particular for the state but also the econ-
omy in its entirety, producers of scientific 
knowledge but also actors in the uses of 
knowledge. In other words, universities are a de-
velopment engine, and necessarily have 
contradictory social roles (Cloete, 2015). 
Universities are seeking to strengthen their re-
search potential, in Africa as in other continents 
(Krishna, 2018). Some universities tend to adopt 
quality criteria and promote research, as well as an 
international policy (Cloete, 2015; Cloete et al., 
2011) and develop effective international partner-
ship agreements.25 Universities also participate 
actively in policy-making activities, issuing policy 
and monitoring functions, either towards  
research, teaching, or management throughout 
the African continent (Bailey, 2015). These bod-
ies, reviewed in seven countries, have no 
comprehensive view of the higher education sys-
tem (except two: South Africa and Mauritius) and 
have difficulties in leveraging data on the higher 
education, and in imposing sanctions or apply  
incentives in the implementation of quality stand-
ards (Bailey 2015, p.195). Bailey also refers to 
political interference, difficulties that relate to  
diverging views on the role of higher education, 
“the absence of a clear pact (or agreement) 
amongst key stakeholders regarding the vision for 
Tertiary Education and Higher Education in the 
into a complex web of relations with research and the 
economy. 
25 A recent study in Tanzania and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo (Chiteng Kot, 2014) found that, “roughly, 4 in 
10 university administrators, academic staff and post-
graduate students at the two institutions had 
participated in international partnerships” (p.267).  
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country and, linked to this, very limited coordina-
tion at the system level. […]. To the extent that the 
councils/commissions were operating in the  
absence of a pact and limited coordination, they 
were vulnerable to fluctuating external influences 
and mixed messages (e.g. shifting priorities/agen-
das or demands from the environment, or 
duplication, confusion or gaps within the broader 
governance system)” (p. 196). 
Moreover, and this is also new, the quality criteria 
become regional, with international and regional 
bodies such as CAMES (francophone Africa) cer-
tifying the quality of Master and Doctoral 
programmes. The role of CAMES in French-
speaking Africa is somewhat stronger than just 
proposing a harmonization of quality assurance. 
By certifying the quality of research in universi-
ties, it legitimises the value of research (Cissé, 
2018). The labelling of research units inside uni-
versities seems to have strong effects, as the 
Tunisian experience has shown (a fourfold in-
crease of science production as measured by 
research articles after the labelling took place), if it 
is accompanied by a substantial increase of fund-
ing (Arvanitis, Hanafi, & Pancera, 2014).  
We know of two series of studies following and 
up-dating the information on large research Uni-
versities in Africa. One such series of observations 
was the HERANA project that involved eight 
large universities, all in Anglophone Africa and 
Mozambique26 (Cloete, 2015; Cloete et al., 2011). 
Another study was a flagship (national) universi-
ties study by D. Teferra27 (2016).  
In a synthesis on the teaching and research in Af-
rican Universities, P. Zeleza (cited by Cloete, 
2015) mentions a series of structural challenges : 
linking the university to industry and National 
Development Plans with stable funding and im-
plementation, confronting the massive expansion 
of students population, providing incentives for 
the business sector in order to promote industry-
university collaborations and promoting scientific 
literacy to popularise STI in society. And N. Clo-
ete concludes that “a university cannot become 
 
26 The project has conducted several rounds of theory-
driven empirical studies that involved the flagship uni-
versities in eight sub-Saharan African countries: the 
University of Botswana, the University of Cape Town 
(South Africa), the University of Dar es Salaam (Tanza-
nia), Eduardo Mondiane University (Mozambique), the 
research-led (or intensive), or world class, if it is 
not part of a national and policy framework with 
differentiation, that is allowing to identify and 
promote research.” 
Despite this apparent consensus on the role of 
universities, international research funding as 
well as high-level policy statements (such as the 
Africa Science and Technology Consolidated Ac-
tion Plan) rarely “recognise explicitly or primarily 
position universities at the core of the overall sci-
ence and technology capacity building strategy” 
(Obamba, 2013). Similarly, when designing its 
policy, the European Union predominantly focus-
ses on partnership aimed at building ‘science and 
technology’ without mentioning universities. “Ca-
pacity building” was for long time designed to 
happen outside academia. It is time to re-integrate 
universities and target them as the main recipient 
of funding for research. 
The difficulty to invest in research activities 
African countries invest little in research and the 
recent up-surge of research activities that we have 
witnessed, as measured by GERD/GDP ratio, is 
still very fragile. Beyond the wishful thinking and 
necessary optimism of any policy-maker and re-
searcher that would like to see a continuation of 
this trend, an appropriate and robust explanation 
is needed. But explanations that link available in-
vestment in research and effects on the economy 
and on society are now necessarily systemic 
(Georghiou, 2015), and imply a serious reconsid-
eration of the role of policy (Mazzucato, 2013) and 
the way knowledge production organisations are 
working together. In effect, more than 50 years of 
research and innovation studies —a domain of the 
social sciences that has been predominantly Euro-
pean— have shown that no one single factor can 
be used in explaining this generic success. Moreo-
ver, the various meanings of the value of science 
(Science Europe, 2017), the complex relation of 
research with society, the role of universities 
make any assessment a complex exercise. Funding 
University of Ghana, the University of Mauritius, Mak-
erere University (Uganda), and the University of Nairobi 
(Kenya). 
27 Addis Ababa, Botswana, Cairo, Chiekh Anta Diop, Dar 
es Salaam, Ibadan, Ghana, Makerere, Mauritius, Nairobi, 
and Zambia. 
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excellent research by itself does not produce de-
velopment. This issue is of paramount importance 
for a foreign funding agency as well as for a na-
tional authority. 
Funding agencies, research councils, and 
other funding agents play a decisive role in this. 
But they are far from being the only actors in this 
arbitration between excellence and relevance. On 
the front of funding agencies, in their study, Erika 
Kraemer-Mbula and Robert Tijssen (2017) note 
that research excellence perceived by researchers 
and research administrators as “(1) creating 
awareness of societal issues, (2) direct benefits to 
disadvantaged communities, and (3) new techno-
logical developments. This is an indication of the 
perceived need for a closer connection between 
research outputs and end users (communities)” (p. 
399). The increasing weight of users on research 
is changing the meaning of research and innova-
tion (Joly, 2017) and African research is no 
exception. This is also evidenced by the answers 
to the survey just mentioned where research ex-
cellence, when described by respondents in their 
own words “its ability to solve a problem, improve 
the lives of people (particularly those marginalised 
or disadvantaged), or change policy” (p. 400). But 
the concrete exercise of estimating the contribu-
tion of a research programme is a difficult one, as 
evidenced for example by the experience of the 
National Research Fund (FNI) of Mozambique 
(2015) that could not obtain responses from 
grantees of its own fund.28  
It also appears as increasingly necessary for any 
funding agent, and particularly for a foreign one, 
that an assessment framework should be designed, 
as part of the effort to support research. In this re-
spect the International Foundation for Science 
(IFS) with its evaluation framework is a valuable 
and unique international experience.29  
 
28 The evaluation of FNI was initially intended to be 
based on a survey of principal investigators of the 208 
funded projects (2006-2013), but response rates were 
very low. It seems that international funders, when they 
do similar surveys, have better response rates, as exem-
plified by the surveys done by the International 
Foundation for Science to this African researchers either 
Employment and circulation of scientists 
Increasing the number of researchers is arguably 
the most important priority for policies support-
ing stronger research and innovation systems in 
Africa. In all African countries there is a shortage 
of highly-skilled personnel, as well as insufficient 
training of Masters and PhDs. This explains the 
important number of African students in Europe, 
USA and other countries. But circulation is not 
limited to going to Europe and the US. In 2009 a 
total of 60,856 foreign students were enrolled in 
South Africa’s universities, placing the country 
11th worldwide for the openness of its higher ed-
ucation system. Some 43,587 of these students 
were from Africa, with SADC countries account-
ing for 41,635, a level of 6.9 per cent of enrolment 
that is way above the SADC target of 5 per cent. 
Moreover, foreign students from other African 
countries in South Africa in 2016 represented 38% 
of all South African PhD students. Enrolments 
from other African countries keep on growing at 
a faster rate than enrolments from within South 
Africa (Cloete, Sheppard, & Bailey, 2015).  
Curiously enough, and judging from the situation 
of South Africa (Kaplan & Höppli, 2017), the la-
bour market for highly-skilled personnel is not 
growing as fast as expected even though there is 
evidence of missing skills and of training capaci-
ties (and growing enrolment rates in all types of 
Higher Education institutions). And the prospect 
is not encouraging since economists tend to con-
sider that the international competition is going 
to get tougher to attract high level talents; some 
countries have already adopted specific measures 
to do so.  
In 2005/06, over half of the migrant populations 
originating from India, Nigeria, the Philippines 
and South Africa were highly educated. Since 
2000, the share of high-educated persons in-
creased in all main emigrant groups, but most 
notably for Indian migrants (+8 percentage points 
funded by IFS or the EU (INCO DEV programme) at that 
time (Jacques Gaillard & Furó Tullberg, 2001b).  
29 The activity of IFS has been well documented, as well 
as its an evaluation framework, called MESIA, which com-
bines bibliometrics, surveys among beneficiaries and 
institutional analysis. The evaluation methodology has 
been used in Vietnam, Africa and Mexico 
(http://www.ifs.se/ifs-publications/). 
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compared with 2000). In 2005/06, there were 
550,000 recent high-educated Indian migrants in 
the OECD. China is the second most important 
country of origin with 320,000 recent highly 
skilled migrants, identical to the total for Sub-Sa-
haran Africa. More recent data on the highly 
educated migrants from North Africa and Sub-Sa-
haran Africa is 460,000 (Database on Immigrants 
in OCDE 2000 and 2005/2006, see Widmaier and 
Dumont, 2011). 
Countries with a high population growth tend to 
show limited increases, or even decreases, in emi-
gration rates. For example, eastern African 
countries such as Rwanda, Burundi or Eritrea ex-
perienced very rapid increases of their 
populations between 2000 and 2005/06, but lim-
ited changes in emigration rates. Countries for 
which emigration rates of the highly skilled in-
creased the most are Congo (+25 percentage 
points), Zimbabwe (+20 percentage points) and 
Malawi (+19 percentage points). 
In Africa, the emigration rate of the highly edu-
cated is on average around 10%, but for some 
countries it can be much higher. For example, 
about half of the highly educated from Congo 
(61%), Mauritius (50%) and Zimbabwe (49%) live 
in an OECD country. Usually, larger countries 
have around average emigration: some 10 per cent 
of South Africa’s most highly skilled are living 
abroad, which represents an estimated 540,000 
South Africans residents in OECD countries, and 
54 per cent of these have tertiary qualifications. 
According to According to a demographic analysis 
published by the OECD, North Africa is the only 
region of the World where a decline in the emi-
gration rate of the highly educated has been 
observed since 2000 (-1.2 percentage point). This 
is due to the rapid improvement in the share of 
persons holding tertiary degrees in that region 
(2011). Finally, it is useful to note that Europe 
hosts 8.9 million Africans, out which 2.4% are ter-
tiary educated and 10.3% are considered ‘brain 
drain30’, that is permanent residents in OECD 
 
30 Emigration rate is the share of the native population of 
country residing abroad at a certain moment, and “brain 
drain” is the emigration rate of persons holding tertiary 
degrees. 
31 These options have been discussed in a collection of 
articles published in Science, Technology and Society 
20/3 (2015) (J. Gaillard, Gaillard, & Krishna, 2015). Also a 
countries (73% in Europe and 15% in the USA). 
To counteract the “brain drain” two options are 
discussed. The first one is mobilizing the diaspora, 
and the second is the return of emigration. A third 
option is the idea that the highly educated is a 
highly mobile population and circulation of the 
highly-skilled should be encouraged. In effect, to-
day circulation is not restricted to the two options 
of mobilizing the diaspora and the return option, 
but the circulation occurs between different coun-
tries where highly qualified people may be needed 
and find attractive positions whatever the nation-
ality. The new Argonauts, a metaphor proposed 
by Saxenian (2006), are those professionals that 
circulate as global citizens where their skills are 
needed. Given the caveat announced by econo-
mists on the unequal distribution of this global 
circulation of talents, one should be careful upon 
generalizations.31  
The diaspora option, the idea of networks of dias-
poras to mobilize the diaspora, was 
enthusiastically proposed in Latin America and 
still exists through programmes of the UNDP like 
TOKTEN, and others.32 The more important ex-
perience in Africa has been the South African 
Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) network in 
South Africa (ceased in 2006). It was designed and 
driven by academics, and was to be a different 
model than the cases of Ireland or India, where 
skilled professionals returned home to open new 
businesses and create new industries (Silicon Bog 
and Bangalore). Another experiment in the case of 
business, the South African Diaspora Network, in 
2001 sought to build business-to-business links 
abroad. It ceased operation in 2003. M. Kahn 
(2015) also mentions “a number of NGOs that 
seek to bridge the expatriate–home gap has  
emerged” that use the web.33  
Diasporas are visibly difficult to mobilize and even 
seem too far away from home in order to make a 
real contribution. Two surveys on research col-
laborations between Latin America and 
Mediterranean countries with Europe showed 
critique of the quite naïve view of the Saxenian Argo-
nauts is provided by JB Meyer (2009). 
32 We have bee reporting on this Tokten programme and 
these similar intents in the case of Arab countries in our 
book (Hanafi & Arvanitis, 2016). 
33 www.homecomingrevolution.com and ‘SABLE’ or SA 
Business Links to Experts www.sablenetwork.com.  
Rigas Arvanitis & Johann Mouton, Working Paper du Ceped 43, September 2019. doi:10.5281/zenodo.3383754 
 26 
that diaspora plays a minimal role in decisions 
about travel, collaborations or even studies abroad 
(A.-M. Gaillard, Canesse, Gaillard, & Arvanitis, 
2013; Jacques Gaillard, Gaillard, & Arvanitis, 
2013). Worse, there is often too much inequality 
between the expatriate professional and the Afri-
can ‘local’ researcher that creates a tension far 
more difficult to manage than the relation be-
tween a North and a South researcher.34  
Finally, it should be mentioned that few sociolog-
ical studies or surveys exist that try to survey 
exiled skilled persons. One such study on South 
African medical practitioners residents in Canada 
concluded that these persons do not seriously con-
sider returning to their homeland (Crush 2012 
cited by Kahn, 2015). 
Brain drain is still a reality and is there to stay. 
From the point of view of the country of depar-
ture, the emigration represents very high losses, 
in particular when comparing to the inflow of 
highly skilled. South Africa is an attractive coun-
try to the highly skilled, but still the number of 
South Africans leaving the country reaches an av-
erage annual exodus of 8,500, half of whom would 
be highly skilled. This loss is ten times the inflow 
to South Africa. As Kaplan and Höppli (2017) in-
dicate: “contrary to some views, there has been no 
mass immigration of returning skilled South Afri-
cans. The most recent data suggests that the rate 
of net outflow is on the increase again. The con-
tinuing and likely accelerating emigration of 
skilled South Africans – now not only white, but 
increasingly black, Indian, and coloured South Af-
ricans – together with the need to enhance the 
growth rate and employment, make consideration 
of this issue vital and urgent”.  
The second option is repatriation. The idea that 
the strengthening of the national scientific insti-
tutions would be enough to retain the human 
resources locally is only partially effective. A series 
of conditions need to be in place: the necessary de-
velopment of an advanced infrastructure is 
needed, and is a necessity to attract highly quali-
fied personnel, as testified by Singapore and India. 
 
34 Some recent case-studies of African professionals 
have been published in a special issue of Revue d'anthro-
pologie des connaissances (2018, Vol.10, n°4), edited by 
Hamidou Dia and Luc Ngwe. 
But coming back is usually “painful, demanding 
and challenging process” and sometimes it is really 
not an option (J. Gaillard et al., 2015, p. 274). In 
Morocco a network of expatriates has been en-
couraged (Azzioui & Menéndez, 2013) and some 
professionals did come back and integrated high-
tech enterprises that were created in Morocco and 
heavily subsidised. All this is marginal (and expen-
sive) mobility. 
Nonetheless, circulation is directly linked to the 
training of the highly qualified working force, 
mainly during the doctoral studies of Africans in 
foreign countries. The PhD is usually done in a 
much longer period for African students than Eu-
ropeans or US students, way more painful, 
relatively costly, and often less continuous over 
time (Kojoue, 2017). But maybe because of this 
difficulty, high-level skilled personnel that enters 
research and academia could be more mobile, and 
circulate rather than emigrate from their country. 
In the recent study on Young Scientists in  
Africa,35 concerning mobility, it was found that 
30% of more than 5,700 respondents had studied 
overseas. The highest rates were found for the Ag-
ricultural sciences (36%) and humanities (39% but 
for a smaller quantum), and other disciplinary ar-
eas all between 27 to 29%. Even more surprising 
were the results when we disaggregated by age in-
terval. For many of the analyses the sample was 
divided into three age groups (39 years and 
younger, between 40 and 49 and 50 years and 
older). The study found that the early career  
academics (39 and younger) are the more mobile 
and definitely more mobile than the late career  
academics. This would suggest that the current 
cohort of early career academics have had more 
opportunities to study and work abroad (and  
returned to Africa) than those who are older than 
50. Again, circulation is the main tendency, 
younger professionals in training finding easily 
opportunities to travel abroad, as compared to the 
immediate older generation. This pattern is evi-
dent across all science domains (with few 
exceptions).  
35 A project directed by J. Mouton (CREST) and C. Beaudry 
(Polytechnique Montréal).  
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FUNDING AS PART OF A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RESEARCH
Our analysis has provided sufficient evidence 
about recent studies on the state of research insti-
tutions in Africa: historical studies, political and 
sociological analyses as well as analyses of the in-
stitutional framework. These studies clearly 
demonstrate the growing importance of universi-
ties, learning and training (especially in post-
graduate studies) in Africa. They also show that 
there is a growing realisation of the importance of 
research in the academic environment. Nonethe-
less both scientific employment and investment in 
research remain very low.  
But the winds are changing. In most African 
countries we see efforts towards the consolidation 
of research universities. We also see the emer-
gence of national authorities concerned with 
science and technology and newly established na-
tional funds dedicated to funding research. At the 
same time, research, in all areas, continues to rely 
heavily on foreign funding, coming from a large 
variety of funders each with their own agendas 
and objectives. Many of these funders proclaim 
that their interests coincide with the “national pri-
orities” of their African partners, or at least the 
needs of African populations. This is risky for for-
eign funders since these “national priorities” are 
not always expressed clearly by the African au-
thorities. The possible neo-colonial modes of 
functioning of foreign partners through interna-
tional collaborations, even where funders attempt 
avoid this, remains a concern.  
In the final analysis, knowledge production in 
many countries remains very fragmented or oc-
curs with less than a critical mass. This is due to 
various factors: the low numbers of academic and 
research population, low if non-existent partici-
pation of private businesses in R&D, insufficient 
budgets and often uncertain commitments of the 
national government. Large philanthropic fun-
ders like B&MG, Welcome, a large variety of non-
profit organisations, as well as the World Bank 
have tried to address the issue with very visible 
policies such as the Centres of Excellence (more 
prominently that of the World Bank and of 
AESA), DELTA and CARI. Ironically, these same 
initiatives tend to proliferate and even risk a cer-
tain scattering of pockets of larger resources. 
There is little understanding of the effect of those 
large initiatives, on equilibriums between various 
actors (policy entities, performing institutions, 
private and public sector…) and the proliferation 
of funding might appear as a new source of ine-
quality among rich and poor partners.  
Our review has also provided evidence of a chang-
ing geography of research for development, with 
the appearance of Chinese partnerships, the rising 
prominence of Morocco, the increasingly central 
role of Kenya (especially in central and eastern Af-
rica) and the continuing scientific consolidation of 
South Africa’s position on the continent. But we 
still have little empirical evidence on the role of 
incentives in knowledge production, on the way 
policies directly affect careers, the staffing of  
public institutions and enterprises, on the circula-
tion of talent, as well as the use and investment of 
financial resources in research. Even the necessary 
articulation of national (or local) relevance and in-
ternational excellence, as well as the 
intermediating role of funders, are rarely  
addressed within clear analytical frameworks. We 
require more precise studies on scientific migra-
tion and mobility, on the effects of funding on 
careers and employment and on the relation  
between policy (when it increases available fund-
ing for research) and employment. The political 
economy of research in Africa appears very 
sketchy and incomplete and needs to be actively 
investigated. 
Position any new initiative in an already 
very populated world of initiatives 
We signal the emergence of a new institutional 
framework in Africa, where governments in 
many countries establish national authorities in 
charge of science and technology (Ministries, 
councils, funding agencies), sometimes with the 
support of the World Bank, AfDB or foreign 
funding agencies; where S&T policies are defined 
concretely and operationalised. A non-exhaustive 
list, apart from the particular case of South Africa, 
could mention Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia, Ethio-
pia, Ghana, Senegal, Burkina Faso…).  
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At the level of institutions, there is some recogni-
tion of the need to have more strategic research 
policies – see for example DRUSSA36 programme 
that has had some impact in providing emphasis 
on universities developing research management 
and uptake strategies. Moreover, universities are 
now often defining international strategies to 
support the academic development, as well as con-
solidating their “third-mission” activities (that is 
beyond teaching and research), which in Africa 
should be a major activity. Research universities 
are slowly emerging as the major players in re-
search in Africa. 
Thus, the governance of funding systems is also 
very much part of this effort to define an increase 
in research activities and better policy-making. 
Policy-making at the national level is more often 
using international collaborations, including co-
operation with foreign partners such as the 
European Union to modify profoundly their fund-
ing practices. The striking example of Egypt’s 
reform of the science policy is very impressive. 
When creating the new STDF (science and tech-
nology development fund) that introduced 
competitive calls for research, Egypt was also cre-
ating a management structure at the Ministry of 
Higher Education and Scientific Research that was 
based on a large fund provided by the EU. This 
management and policy unit has been instrumen-
tal, and curiously was set-up before the revolution 
of 2011. It survived the revolution, as well as the 
further political change that was experience by 
that country. Something similar happened in Tu-
nisia, although we believe that the policy changes 
that allowed the reinforcement of the research 
were largely defined prior to the 2011 Revolution 
(M'henni & Arvanitis, 2012). The EU considers 
PASRI, a programming experiment on science 
technology and innovation in Tunisia that was 
funded by the EU, as a success, but it very much 
relies on an already existing structure that has 
been very resilient politically. 
 
36 Development Research Uptake in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(DRUSSA) was a five-year, DFID-funded programme sup-
porting 22 Universities across Africa to strengthen the 
management of research uptake. It ran from October 
2011 to September 2016. The purpose of DRUSSA was to 
help improve the capacity of universities to contribute 
research evidence in pro-poor policy and practice. 
DRUSSA achieved this through sharing learning on insti-
tutional change and research uptake strategy, 
The effect of restructuring and strengthening of 
the research management systems because of mul-
tilateral and bilateral agreements also seems to 
take place in the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) under the increasing influ-
ence of the South African NRF and national 
organisations in Uganda, and Kenya, but also con-
cerns smaller countries. 
But the main challenge is the heavy reliance on 
foreign funding, countries and universities alike, 
for their research effort. This makes the definition 
of one’s own research policy or research strategy 
quite difficult. Moreover, levels of employment in 
research are still low, although they are probably 
growing and will continue to grow, depending on 
structural economic conditions and legal con-
straints (immigration policies, etc…).  
Any new funding initiative should be careful to be 
different from the on-going programmes. It 
should be constructed with a strong local manage-
ment and scientific partnership that involves 
strong African institutions in order to have the le-
gitimacy necessary to avoid the risk of a neo-
colonial situation. The EU has had a major expe-
rience with creation of the PRIMA initiative and 
some lessons should be drawn with African part-
ners based on this experience.  
Some cautionary notes on funding excellent 
individuals, but with active supportive 
functions: examples of IFS and ERAWIDE 
The Abidjan Call is asking to create an African Re-
search Council; it should be quite clear from this 
paper, that many assumptions concerning the way 
research functions in Europe are not valid in Africa. 
We would like to insist on one major difference 
(among many other): careers in African research 
institutions can rarely be exclusively research-ori-
ented. Even with individuals very strongly 
committed to research, with strong training in re-
search (which also means they have had extended 
supporting training of university staff in research uptake 
and communication, and through facilitating and 
strengthening networks between DRUSSA universities, 
other research management bodies, external stakehold-
ers and research users, including policymakers. 
https://www.acu.ac.uk/focus-areas/research-manage-
ment-uptake/drussa 
Observing and Funding African Research 
 29 
training with foreign partners in foreign coun-
tries), the actual functioning of institutions will 
necessitate to take into account needs other than 
those of research only. Two different activities are 
undermining the time a professor at the university 
can dedicate for research: teaching loads and con-
sultancies. Both should be taken into account by 
any future funding scheme, knowing none can be 
avoid. As far as consultancies are concerned, they 
can serve the purposes of research, if (and only if) 
they are recognised by the academic institution.  
To our knowledge there exists only one example 
of funding in developing countries that is directed 
to individuals based on excellence and high quality 
new researchers, located in their own country and 
not necessarily based on North-South partner-
ships. It is the experience of the International 
Foundation for Science (IFS, see above). An im-
portant aspect of the success of IFS might have 
been the fact that the relatively small grants are 
surrounded by additional activities or funding 
(equipment, organisation of workshops in specific 
topics that are interesting a large number of grant-
ees, etc…). In other words, IFS does not make any 
assumption that the local socio-economic context 
will be helpful, thus providing support to its 
grantees that researchers in Europe would find in 
their own institutions and social environments.37 
Moreover, funding for individuals should not cre-
ate a situation of an autonomous structure of the 
funded project inside its host institution, func-
tionning as a “parasite” cell in the academic 
organism. Projects should be, on the contrary, a 
 
37 This configuration (small grants and support functions) 
is not exclusive to IFS, see for example the French 
CORUS programmes to French-speaking African coun-
tries, Madagascar, Senegal, Cameroon and Burkina Faso 
(Bolay & Michelon, 2009; Hamelin & Huber, 2009). Inci-
dently, the Evaluation report of CORUS programme 
insists on the necessity to support “valorisation of the re-
search” and “interaction with users” as well as “a better 
insertion in international networks”. 
38 Interestingly, the Egyptian experience of the RDI office 
for managing research projects at the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Research (based on European funds) 
could be seen as a unique experiment of good practice. 
Documented in K. Papageorgiou’s Background report on 
Egypt for MENAFUND project (Arvanitis et al., 2014) 
(Egypt report available upon request). 
39 IDRC managed such a programme, Research on 
Knowledge Systems (RoK)  at the beginning of the millen-
nium (Graham, 2006). The programme also gave insights 
way of enhancing the training for research, and 
management of research projects for the univer-
sity. Specific arrangement, of course could be valid 
experiences, by an appropriate recognition by the 
host institution.38 Here the individual grant 
should be explicitly used in order to fund the for-
mation or consolidation of a local team with the 
possibility of a relatively small grant. The Euro-
pean Commission has some scattered experience 
of such funding under FP7 (e.g. projects 
ERAWIDE in the Mediterranean region, Pancera 
et al., 2013).  
A last provision would be that the funding should 
not necessarily be a collaboration project with a 
Northern partner—rather the projects could be or 
not collaborative. This provision would make a 
difference with the funding delivered by practi-
cally all foreign funders. In such a programme, not 
necessarily geared toward “partnerships”, all the 
typically complicated relations between 
North/South PIs, lead/co-lead would fall. That 
should permit also to emphasize the necessary  
integration to international research networks 
without the patronage of a Northern partner.39  
Finally, the management structure, in all the fund-
ing initiatives we have reviewed, is of paramount 
importance. The team of the management struc-
ture should be in phase with the grantees and 
undertand the management and practical aspects 
as well as the scientific challenges,40 thus creating 
strong confidence linkages between programme 
managers and scientists. 
on public-private partnerships (Graham & Woo, 2009) 
and formed the basis of the thinking of IDRC today in 
partnerhips, that is reflected in its participation in the 
Science Granting Councils initiatives as well as in its anal-
ysis of the changes in research systems (O’Brien & 
Arvanitis, 2018). 
40 Research management offices are becoming more fre-
quent in research universities and face a large variety of 
tasks (Botha & Hunter-Hüsselmann, 2016). In the Arab 
countries (Africa and Middle East) TEMPUS, now 
ERASMUS Plus programmes have been instrumental in 
consolidating the research management functions in 
universities. In Africa, there is no equivalent programme 
and it seems that INCONet type projects (like CASSNET-
Plus) have not explicitely discussed this aspect. When 
talking science policy, in the EU-Africa dialogue, universi-
ties do not appear as a major player. 
Rigas Arvanitis & Johann Mouton, Working Paper du Ceped 43, September 2019. doi:10.5281/zenodo.3383754 
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